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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF GEOMAGNETIC DISTURBANCES ON ELECTRIC POWER
SYSTEMS
by
Benjamin J Hynes
The University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee 2015
Under the Supervision of Professor Ronald Perez
Abstract: Solar storms that generate coronal mass ejections are a cause for concern due
to the damage that they cause in high voltage power grids. Geomagnetically induced
currents can be introduced onto the grid and cause many adverse effects. The
vulnerability of the bulk electric power systems to such events has increased during the
past few decades because the power system transmission lines have become more
interconnected and have increased in length. Real and reactive power flows, voltage
fluctuations, frequency shifts, undesired relay operations, higher order harmonic currents,
undesired damage to assets and failure of assets are all possible outcomes from a large
geomagnetic disturbance. A 100 year solar storm could cause mass blackouts and
colossal damage to any high voltage power grid, if proper monitoring and mitigation
techniques are not used.
This thesis presents an in-depth background on geomagnetic disturbances and how they
affect the electrical power grid. The thesis will model geomagnetic disturbances on a
theoretical grid using the simulation software OpenDSS. The thesis will also discuss
monitoring and mitigation techniques that can be applied to the power grid to lessen the
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chance of failure or damage to assets, and analyze real world data collected from a
Midwestern solar storm that had an effect on two power transformers equipped with online
monitoring.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Reliable electrical power systems are something that most people in the United
States take for granted. Every time you turn on a light switch, you expect the light to come
on. The electrical power system has become so reliable that most utilities, especially
Wisconsin Electric, brag about their percentage of uptime. Electrical power systems are
vulnerable to widespread disturbances, which can be outside of the control of man. A
popular example of this vulnerability is the March 13th, 1989 blackout where 6 million
people were affected by one intense Geomagnetic Induced Current (GIC) event. Large
scale outages, such as the example just listed, can have severe economic impacts.
Understanding the vulnerability of the electric power system, monitoring GIC in systems
and deploying a mitigation program can reduce negative impacts on the electric power
system and reduce the likely hood of a large scale outage in the future.
Geomagnetic storms are a major threat to the electrical power system.
Geomagnetic storms are a temporary disturbance of the Earth’s Magnetosphere caused
by a solar wind derived from a cloud of magnetic particles that have been discharged
from the Sun which interact with the magnetic field around the Earth. The Magnetosphere
of the Earth is compressed from the solar wind pressure. The transfer of energy, to the
magnetosphere from the solar winds magnetic field, is caused by interactions of the
plasma’s movement through the magnetosphere.
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Figure 1 Earth's magnetic field interacting with solar activity [1]
Coronal mass ejections are the major source of geomagnetic storms. Coronal
mass ejections occur when the outer solar atmosphere violently releases gas and
magnetic fields. A large coronal mass ejection can contain a billion tons of matter that can
be accelerated to several million miles per hour. On average, a coronal mass ejection can
travel from the sun to the Earth in approximately 98 hours, and can range in speed from
200 kilometer per hour to 1000 kilometer per hour [2]. Intense geomagnetic storms with
aurora electrojets of solar particles (1 million amperes or more) are the source of the
aurora borealis and aurora australis. These intense geomagnetic storms also cause
distortions in the Earth’s magnetic field that may interfere with communications and
electrical power systems [3]. During periods of high solar activity, it is estimated that 50100 small to medium solar events occur each day; larger events that significantly affect
communications occur weekly [4]. Solar activity has fairly predictable cycles, it peeks
about every 11 years. The Earth is on the downward peak of solar cycle 24 [5], which
2

peaked during April of 2014 and is depicted in Figure 2. Even though we are past the
peak of the cycles, the largest geomagnetic storms occur two to three years after cycle
peaks

[6].

Figure 2: Solar Cycle 24 [7]
The intensity of geomagnetic storms is monitored by the Space Weather Prediction
Center of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The intensity of each
geomagnetic store is rated on a logarithmic scale called the K-index. This scale quantifies
disturbances in the horizontal component of the Earth’s magnetic field with a value of 09, with nine being the most violent. The label K comes from the German work Kennziffer
meaning “characteristic digit”. The K-index value is derived from the maximum
3

fluctuations of horizontal components observed on a magnetometer during a three hour
interval. The Kp index may also be seen in solar storm references. The Kp index can be
derived by calculating a weighted average of K indices form a network of geomagnetic
observatories. Table 1 contains an overview of Kp values, frequency between
occurrences, common issues associated with the storm, and severity.

Table 1 NOAA Space Weather Scales [8]
The eight daily K-index values can also be averaged to find the daily A-index.
Geomagnetic field fluctuations are measured in units of nano-Tesla (nT).

1  = 10 

1  =

. To put this into relative terms, the Earth’s magnetic field at the

poles is approximately equal to 70,000  = 0.7 
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.

The K-index is not a useful indicator of how intense a geomagnetic storm will
impact electric utility systems. It does not account for the rate of change associated with
the variation. For example, a K-9 geomagnetic storm with relatively fast variations will be
more disruptive than a K-9 storm that slowly changes the Earth’s magnetic field. The
Earth’s magnetic field fluctuations are a result from an electrical potential gradient of low
frequency quasi-dc along the Earth surface, typically in an east to west direction. Quasidc potentials exist in geoelectric fields, characterized by relatively slow time variation
values of the same polarity. Quasi-dc potentials are also commonly referred to as Earth
surface potentials. This potential gradient is a function of the Earth conductivity and the
rate of change in the magnetic field. The greater the rate of change of this magnetic field,
the greater the potential difference between two points on the Earth’s surface which will
cause the greatest conditions to Geomagnetically induce currents in to the utility power
system.
Geomagnetic storms influence electric power systems by causing GIC’s to flow in
power lines through the neutral of grounded wye transformers. In a grounded wye
transformer, the common grounded neutral lead create the closed loop circuit in
association with the Geo-Electric Field. A sample circuit that grounded wye transformers
create is seen in Figure 3. Longer transmission lines typically see larger GIC, due to the
size of the transmission line acting as a larger antenna for the GIC and having a larger
area for the magnetic induction to act on. Electric utilities in the far northern latitudes
typically see more GIC activity, due to their location in relation to the auroral electrojet
currents.
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Figure 3 Grounded Wye Transformer Circuit [9]
The geology of the Earth also plays a key role in GIC activity. Since the current is
being conducted through the neutral of the grounded wye through the Geo-Electric Field
that of Earth, the conductivity of the region of the event can cause greater vulnerability to
events. Figure 4 shows the different regions across the United States of America. For the
purpose of this thesis, I will be focusing on the state of Wisconsin which consists of three
different regions: The Interior Plains (Michigan) IP-3 Region, The Interior Plains (North
Dakota) IP-1 Region and The Superior Upland SU-1 Region. The Resistivity per depth
charts are located in
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Appendix A.

Figure 4 Map of USA resistivity [10]
The Geomagnetically induced quasi-dc currents that flow through the grounded
neutral of a transformer during a geomagnetic disturbance can cause the core or the
transformer to magnetically saturate on alternate half cycles. Saturated transformer cores
cause harmonic distortions and creates additional reactive power or Volt Amp Reactance
(VAR) demands on the electric power systems. This increase of VAR demands can lead
to a reduction is system voltage and overloading of long transmission lines. Additionally,
the compounding factor of harmonics to the system can cause protective relays to operate
improperly and cause shunt capacitor banks to overload. Both the increase of VAR’s on
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the power distribution system and the addition of unwanted harmonics can have a
cascading effect of damage which can cause major power failures.
During the last two to three decades there has been a trend of smaller generation
plants closing, and the ones that remain open adding extra generation capacity and
operating closer to their limits. This creates a power transmission system that is operated
closer to their upper limits, increasing the vulnerability to widespread geomagnetic
disturbances. As more and more power is transmitted over longer distances to meet the
grown demand [11], stability margins are further reduced. Projected continued growth in
higher population load centers without corresponding growth in generation and
distribution capacity and the public’s resistance to add new high capacity lines in large
urban areas will further compound this issue in the future. If proper monitoring and
mitigation techniques are not deployed over the power system, large scale outages could
become more common in the near future.

8

Chapter 2 Effects of GIC on the Electrical Power System
The first recorded event of GIC having negative impacts on the electrical power
system dates back to a solar storm on March 24th, 1940. VAR variations of up to 20%
were recorded. Multiple transformers tripped offline as a result of this storm in the Maine
and Ontario region of North America. New York City encountered VAR variations of up to
10%. [12]. This event in 1940 triggered the start of recording and investigating the
coloration of solar activity and its effects on the utility power system.
The average activity on the sun has little effect on utility power systems. When
activity rises above the G-1 level from Table 1, the cause for concern greatly rises, and
utility power systems should heighten there awareness to the possibility of GIC activity.
The greater the G scale event is, the higher the probability of unwanted damage from
GIC.
Geomagnetic storms can cause large variation in the Earth’s magnetic field which
influences the Earth’s surface electric potential. The most severe geomagnetic storms
can produce surface potentials that reach 5,000 / and can last for several minutes.
For comparison, the current in the global electrical circuit is approximately 100 −

150 /. [13] The induced voltages produce slowly oscillating GIC on the utility power

systems that can be on the order of tens to hundreds of amperes, and have a frequency
in the millihertz range. This unwanted GIC can have a huge impact on the bulk power
system by saturating transformer cores and changing VAR flow causing large power
fluctuations on the grid. If assets are not properly monitored and taken offline when high
values of GIC are encountered, equipment failure or improper operation of equipment can
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cause large losses of assets to the utility power companies. The increased injection of
harmonic currents into the system from saturated transformers can increase burden on
static capacitors as well as interfere with operation of control and protection systems [14].
GIC in a grounded wye transformer can cause major damage. The presence of the
quasi-dc GIC in the transformer windings causes a half cycle saturation or shift of the
transformers operations range on the magnetization cure as seen in Figure 5 [15].

Figure 5 Saturated Half Cycle Graph [16]
GIC in the transformer offset the magnetic flux. The offset magnetic flux causes a
magnetizing current waveform with a greatly increased amplitude that is typically present
on ether the positive or negative peaks of the AC wave form. When power transformers
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are operated near capacity, even a small amount of saturation can push the unit outside
of the design specifications causing premature failure or even catastrophic failure. When
GIC in the transformer offsets the unwanted magnetic flux, one can typically see currents
between 1-100 amperes from the grounded wye connection to the Earth’s ground. For
comparison, power transformers in normal operations will have less than one ampere
from the grounded wye connection to Earth’s ground.
VAR consumption by the transformer and an increase of harmonics generated by
the half cycle saturations are unwanted side effects of GIC activity. Half cycle saturation
of the transformer for an extended amount of time will cause stray flux to be introduced
into the transformers structural tank members and current windings. When stray flux is
found in the current windings, the windings will increase in temperature. The increase in
temperature can cause many damaging side effects. It can cause damage to the
insulation of the windings and leave permanent damage as seen in Figure 6 [17].
Unwanted overheating of the core can also cause an increase of gas content in the
transformer. A Dissolved Gas Analyzer will be able to detect these key gasses in the
transformer oil, but not in time to prevent any damage from occurring and hence is not a
good way to mitigate damage to power transformers from GIC activity.
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Figure 6 Core Damage to Power Transformer Windings [18]
During GIC events, load tap changing transformers can see increases of usage.
Autotransformers on the bulk power system are fitted with mechanical load tap changers
to compensate for the voltage fluctuations on the power grid, interconnecting different
winding confirmations to buck or boost the voltage. When GIC events cause system
voltage variations, caused by increased VAR demands, the load tap changing
transformers will keep up with the requests to steady the voltage across the system. This
causes unwanted wear of the tap changing device from the more than average operation
of the device during a geomagnetic storm.
GIC can cause relay and protection systems of the utility power systems to fail in
three distinct ways. The first and most common failure mode of relaying and protection
systems is due to GIC is when Static VAR compensators, capacitor banks and line relay
operations can mistake harmonic currents produced by the saturation of transformers for
a fault current overload. This may cause items to be pulled out of service when there truly
12

is not a problem and also may cause local outages in the bulk power system. The second
and most severe failure mode for relays and protections systems due to GIC is when the
relay fails to operate Current transformers, used to monitor load on transformers, can
become distorted due to GIC activity and cause the protection scheme not to operate
when there is a detected fault condition. This type of event causes the most damage to
the bulk power system. The last type of failure mode for relay and protect systems of the
utility power system is when GIC activity causes a delayed or slowed response of the
protection device due to remnant flux in the current transformer. The remnant flux reduces
the current transformers time to saturate, and my not present any signs of warning for
days [19]. Differential relay schemes on transformers are particularly susceptible to GIC
events and should not be used.
Differential relay schemes that protect transformers are susceptible and are known
to malfunction during GIC activity. Current transformer saturations and harmonics
generated by the saturation for the power transformer cause the relay to fail to operate if
there are simultaneous faults in the power transformer. Modern relays have increased
their sensitivity to harmonics generated during transformer energization current inrush
lessening the possibility of this failure mode, but many of the legacy equipment on our
bulk power system are still susceptible to this type of failure if the relay equipment has
not been upgraded in the past decade or two.
GIC events can cause an increase of wear on utility power system circuit breakers.
During GIC events, an increase in secondary arc currents inside the circuit breaker may
occur, which is caused by the current that flows through a fault arc during and after a
single line to ground fault caused by electromagnetic and electrostatic coupling from the
13

two energized phases. This increase in secondary arc current due to GIC may be as high
as ten times normal operation. This increase of current causes difficulty extinguishing the
arc contained in the circuit breaker. The time of which the circuit breaker trips and senses
zero current is therefore increased causing the recovery time of circuit breakers to be
longer than normal. In the United States, a re-closure typically tries three times before
remaining fully open. The added time to sense zero current can cause altered readings.
As a result, the re-closures will be prevented from actuating, remaining open and causing
unwanted localized outages.
Static VAR compensators installed in the bulk power system along with capacitor
banks are becoming more common. When used in conjunction with each other they can
rapidly control real and reactive power flow. Both are susceptible to GIC events and can
be negatively impacted. A grounded wye connected capacitor bank can quickly trip out,
for protection reasons, when excess current is detected on the path to Earth’s ground.
Tripping the capacitor bank out of service will prevent the system experiencing excess
voltage which can cause a cascading failure of the capacitor cans in the bank. When
capacitor banks combined with SVC’s trip out, the bulk power system can see massive
power fluctuations. The power fluctuations can cause damage to any item that is still
actively connected to the bulk power system. This cascading effect has occurred in the
past, as was the case in the large scale outage in 1989, and if proper monitoring and
mitigation techniques are not applied to the system we all depend on, will occur again.
The distribution system of the United States power system ultimately will see the
outages generated by GIC events. The cascading effects of transformer, protection, SVC,
capacitor banks being tripped offline, and distribution fuses blowing will cause unwanted
14

short term outages. If proper monitoring and mitigation techniques are not deployed
across the bulk power system, unwanted catastrophic failure of assets will happen
causing the outages to last until the assets can be replaced which may take weeks to
months.
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Chapter 3 Mathematical Modeling of GIC
GIC events can be modeled in simple dc circuits, due to their low frequency quasidc nature, making bulk power system GIC mathematical modeling quite easy. Using the
nodal admittance matrix method, one may convert the driving voltages to equivalent
current sources. The following power network is comprised of nodes connected together
and to ground. For a voltage source  and impedance , the equivalent circuit has

components  = 1/ and  = /, where  is the admittance and  is the current. A matrix

solution is calculated for the voltage of each node, and the node voltages are then used
to obtain the GIC in the network.

To develop general equations for the nodal admittance matrix method, consider

nodes  and  in the middle of the network in Figure 7. Here,  represents the admittance

of the transmission line between nodes  and , and  and  represent the admittances
to ground from nodes  and  respectively.

Figure 7: Modeling GIC using the nodal admittance matrix method [20]
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Applying Kirchhoff’s current law, the equivalent equation for any node  will be in the form:


  = 



≠

The current in a transmission line is determined by the current source, the voltage
differences between nodes of the transmission line and the admittance of the line.
 + #$ − $ % = 
Inserting Kirchhoff’s current law into the prior formula, the following is derived.




  + #$ − $ % = 





The total of the equivalent source currents directed into each node is as follows, and
substituted into the prior.


  = &





& + #$ − $ % = 


The equation above involves the nodal voltages $ and the current to ground from each

node  is unknown. The nodal voltage $ is related to the current to ground  by Ohm’s

law so one can substitute for either $ or  to obtain equations involving only one set of

unknowns. In this derivation we will make the following substitution.
 = $ 
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Substituting  gives the following equation only involving the node voltage $ as the

unknown:



& + #$ − $ % = $ 


Or:




& = $  +  $  −  $ 




The prior formula may be converted in matrix form:
'&(=')('(

Using the prior matrix form, the following theoretical six bus system can by analyzed using
GPS coordinates throughout the state of Wisconsin.

Figure 8 Six Bus Example Power System [20]

Tables 2 through 4 contain required data to calculate estimated GIC.
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Grounding
Name
Latitude
Longitude
Resistance
(Ohms)
Sub 1
46.554666
-90.990730
0.2
Sub 2
43.113731
-89.232048
0.2
Sub 3
43.019590
-88.040024
0.2
Table 2 Example Substation locations and ground grid resistance

From
To
Length
Resistance
Bus
Bus
(km)
(Ohms/Phase)
1
2
3
407
4.334
2
4
5
97
4.028
Table 3 Example Transmission line information
Line

Name
T1

Resistance W1
(Ohm/Phase)
0.5

Resistance W2
(Ohm/Phase)
N/A

T2
0.2 (Series)
0.2 (Common)
T3
0.5
N/A
Table 4 Example Transformer and Autotransformer Winding Resistance Values

One must properly calculate the distance between two points to accurately derive the
estimated GIC. It is necessary to take into account the latitude for the substation when
converting its longitudinal separation into the distance due to the ellipsoidal shape of the
Earth. Using the WGS84 model, the ellipsoidal model of the Earth is used and distances
will be more accurately calculated.

Parameter
Symbol
Value
Equatorial
A
6378.137 km
Radius
Polar Radius
B
6356.752 km
Eccentricity
E2
0.00669437999014
squared
Table 5 Parameter of the WGS84 Earth Model
19

The North-South distance is given by:
* =

+
- ∗ ∆*0
180

M is equal to the radius of the curvature in the meridian plane and is calculated by the
following formula:
1 #1 −  2 %
-=
#1 − 3 2 2 4%
4=

.

*01 + *05
2

Substituting values from Table 5, the North South distance in kilometers can be
calculated.
* = #111.133 − 0.56 cos#24%% ∗ ∆*0

∆*0 is the difference in latitude in degrees between the two substations A and B.

Similarly the East-West distance is given by:
*< =

+
= >? 4 ∗ ∆*?
180

20

==

1

@1 − 3 2 2 4

Substituting the values from Table 5, the following formula is derived for East-West
distances in kilometers.
*< = #111.5065 − 0.1872 cos#24%% ∗ cos 4 ∗ ∆*?
Northward
Eastward
Distance (km) Distance (km)
1
2
3
-382.387
138.078
2
4
5
-10.459
97.103
Table 6 Example Eastward and Northward distance calculation results
Line

From Bus

To Bus

Assuming an electrical field magnitude of 10 / with an Eastward direction, Table 7

was calculated using:

AAAB
3 ? AA*AB = 3C *C + 3D *D

AAAB is the geoelectric field at the location of the transmission line and *
AAAB is the
Where 3

incremental length vector.

Induced
Line
Voltage
(Volts)
1
2
3
1380.78
2
4
5
971.03
Table 7 Example Induced Voltage Calculations
From
Bus

To
Bus

The next step is to construct an equivalent circuit of the system as shown in Figure 9.
21

Figure 9 Example Equivalent Circuit of System [20]

The circuit in Figure 9 can be solved as is, but it is more convenient to perform the
calculations using nodal analysis where the voltage sources are converted to current
sources and all impedance elements are converted to their equivalent admittances as
seen in Figure 10.

Figure 10 Example Circuit of system in Nodal Form [20]

The admittance matrix of the circuit shown in Figure 10 can be constructed as is shown
in the following formula.
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3
3
G
+
HK
FHI + 3HJ
3
F
−
F
HK
)=F
0
F
F
F
0
E

−

3
HK

3
3
3
+
+
HM + 3HJ2
HL HK
3
−
HL
0

0

3
HL
3
3
+
HL HK2
3
−
HK2
−

Q
P
P
0
P
P
3
−
P
HK2
P
3
3 P
+
HIN + 3HK2 HK2 O
0

Substituting the values into the prior matrix, the following matrix is calculated.
3.578
−0.692
)=R
0
0

−0.692
19.442
−15
0

0
0
−15
0
U ℎ?
15.745 −0.745
−0.745 3.472

The current vector can be calculated using the nodal currents as shown in the following
matrix.
−WK
W
W=R K U
−WK2
WK2
Nodal current injections can be found using the following equations:
WK =
WK2 =

3 K
= 955.78 X
HK
3 K2
= 723.21 X
HK2

Using Ohms Law, the node voltages are calculated.
23

0.287
0.039
 = ')( W = R
0.038
0.008

0.039
0.205
0.197
0.042

0.038
0.198
0.254
0.054

0.008 −955.78
−258.729
0.042
955.78
45.838
UR
U = R
U
0.055 −723.21
8.050
0.299
723.21
209.682

The three phase GIC flow is calculated using the various relationships derived from the
circuit. The following calculations can further be divided by three to obtain the per phase
GIC flow.
3
WI =  Y
Z = −705.625 X
HI + 3HJ
W

2

= WK + # − 2 % Y
WL = #N − 2 % Y

3
Z = −367.404 X
HK

3
Z = 566.62 X
HL

3
WM = 2 Y
Z = 171.893 X
HM + 3HJ2

3
WN[ = WK2 + #N − [ % Y Z = 573.037 X
HK2
3
WIN = [ Y
Z = 571.86 X
HIN + 3HJN
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Chapter 4 Computer Simulation of GIC
The mathematical modeling of GIC is a fairly simple process as seen in Chapter 3
Mathematical Modeling of GIC. When the system becomes large (more than a few nodes)
the system matrix becomes very large quite quickly. Computer simulations can make the
calculations required for analyzing a large complex system with many nodes an easy
process. One option for a computer simulation of GIC is a free simulation tool developed
by the Electrical Power Research Institute called OpenDSS.
The OpenDSS is a comprehensive electrical power system simulation tool
primarily for electric utility power distribution systems. It supports nearly all frequency
domain (sinusoidal steady‐state) analyses commonly performed on electric utility power
distribution systems. In addition, it supports many new types of analyses that are
designed to meet future needs related to smart grid, grid modernization, and renewable
energy research. The OpenDSS tool has been used since 1997 in support of various
research and consulting projects requiring distribution system analysis. Many of the
features found in the program were originally intended to support the analysis of
distributed generation interconnected to utility distribution systems and that continues to
be a common use. Other features support analysis of such things as energy efficiency in
power delivery and harmonic current flow. The OpenDSS is designed to be indefinitely
expandable so that it can be easily modified to meet future needs.
The example circuit from Chapter 3 will be used for the following simulation using
OpenDSS.

25

Figure 11 Example Three-Phase Equivalent Circuit [20]
Grounding
Resistance
(Ohms)
Sub 1
46.554666
-90.990730
0.2
Sub 2
43.113731
-89.232048
0.2
Sub 3
43.019590
-88.040024
0.2
Table 8 Example Substation locations and ground grid resistance
Name

Latitude

Longitude

From
To
Length
Resistance
Bus
Bus
(km)
(Ohms/Phase)
1
2
3
407
4.334
2
4
5
97
4.028
Table 9 Example Transmission line information
Line

Name
T1

Resistance W1
(Ohm/Phase)
0.5

Resistance W2
(Ohm/Phase)
N/A

T2
0.2 (Series)
0.2 (Common)
T3
0.5
N/A
Table 10 Example Transformer and Autotransformer Winding Resistance Values

Note: OpenDSS does not take into account the ellipsoidal shape of the Earth in its
computation as described in the Chapter 3 Mathematical Modeling of GIC.

26

The OpenDSS simulation has three main components. First, the transmission line
models are generated use a quasi-dc voltage, computed internally using Faraday’s Law.
The line of code for transmission line 1 follows:

Figure 12 Example OpenDSS Transmission Line Input

Figure 13 OpenDSS Transmission Line Model [20]
The second component required for GIC simulations with OpenDSS is the
Transformer Model. There are three options available for the Model; Delta-Grounded Wye
(GSU), Grounded-Wye Grounded Wye (with or without delta tertiary) and Grounded Why
Autotransformers (with or without delta tertiary). Only connections to ground are included
in the model, delta and ungrounded wye windings are excluded. For the simulations we
will use an Autotransformer and two GSU’s.
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Figure 14 Example OpenDSS Autotransformer Input

Figure 15 OpenDss Autotransformer Circuit [20]

Figure 16 Example OpenDSS GSU Input
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Figure 17 OpenDSS GSU Model [20]
After entering all the parameters and running the code (Appendix B OpenDss Code with
Results), the results were generated. Figure 18 depicts the simulated transmission lines
in relation to the arbitrarily chosen GPS coordinates in the state of Wisconsin. The
arbitrary GPS coordinates represent the bulk power system in Wisconsin, per available
maps published by The America Transmission Company. The simulation used a
calculated average ground resistivity derived from the resistive values from Figure 25,
Figure 26 and Figure 27 in Appendix A. If this simulation was run for the same equipment,
but in a different geographical location, the resistivity of the new location would have to
be taken into consideration.
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Figure 18 OpenDSS GIC Simulation with Map
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Chapter 5 Evaluation of Susceptibility of Power Transformers

The Total GIC Susceptibility of utility power assets is a complicated topic. Design,
location, age, life expectancy and many others factors need to be taken into consideration
to approximate the susceptibility that power transformers and other bulk power system
assets will be damaged during GIC events. The treatment or replacement of expensive
assets and application of mitigation techniques are costly and sometimes unneeded.
Having each individual asset thermally tested for susceptibility can be avoided if general
asset screenings are performed to a power utility’s fleet. Higher voltage transformers
maybe exposed to higher levels of GIC, and are costly to repair. The cost to monitor is
just a fraction of the replacement cost of the asset. It is in the best interest of the power
utility to monitor expensive assets to prevent unnecessary damage during GIC activity.
Transformers greater than 200 kV on the primary should be monitored for GIC
susceptibility regardless of condition or location due to the cost to replace if damaged
[21].
The evaluation of the susceptibility of a transformer to the effects of GIC can be
completed in multiple steps. The first step is to determine the susceptibility of the
transformer based solely on its design. The second step of the evaluation process is to
consider the location and the expected levels of exposure to GIC. Combining design
information and the GIC level susceptibility information is critical to determine the Total
Susceptibility of a transformer to effects of GIC [22]. A susceptible design type may be
located in an area where the expected levels of GIC are low, therefore the Total GIC
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Susceptibility of the transformer would be much lower than that indicated by only its
design.
A fleet of transformers can be divided into the following categories to define its design
based susceptibility classification to the effects of GIC:
Classification-A: Transformers not susceptible to effects of the GIC
Classification-B: Transformers least susceptible to core saturation but
susceptible to high magnetizing current.
Classification-C: Transformers susceptible to core saturation and possible
structural parts overheating.
Classification-D: Transformers susceptible to core saturation as well as possible
damaging windings and structural parts overheating.
The evaluation of the Design – Based susceptibility may consider the following key
electrical parameters and core and winding design of a transformer.
Transformer winding design:
•

If the HV winding of the transformer is connected in delta, the transformer is not
susceptible to GIC and may be considered to be in Classification A.

•

In transformers with core types other than the three-phase, three-limb core, if the
LV winding of the transformer is delta-connected, or if the transformer has a delta
connected tertiary winding the transformer may be susceptible to possible
significant winding overheating and should be considered to be in Classification
D.
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Transformer type:

Figure 19 Core DC flux path in various core types [7]
•

Three-phase core form transformer with a three-limb core has lower susceptibility
to core saturation but it is susceptible to high levels of magnetizing current and
tank heating may be considered to be in Classification B.

•

Transformers with core types other than the three-phase three-limb core, using a
T-beam (shell 1 form), or near-core flitch-plates or tie-rods (core form) are
susceptible to core saturation and structural parts overheating and may be
considered to be in Classification C.
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•

Transformers with core types other than the three phase three limb cores with
magnetic steel bolts through the core limbs or yokes are susceptible to
overheating of core bolts during core saturation and may be considered in
Classification D.

•

Some of the pre–1970 shell form designs could be susceptible to appreciable
winding overheating due to high circulating currents in the low voltage windings
when the core saturates and may be considered to be in Classification D.

For power transformers designs not mentioned in the criteria above, a full assessment
should be performed to determine the susceptibility of the design to GIC activity.
The GIC level-based assessment represents the other part in the process of
evaluating the Total Susceptibility of a transformer. As stated in the above, the Total
Susceptibility of a transformer cannot be accurately analyzed without considering the
level of GIC the transformer may be exposed to. This level of GIC is determined by a
number of factors, such as the region where the transformer is located, the resistance of
the soil in that location, and other factors. These items have been discussed in Chapter
2. The process of evaluating the GIC Level–Based susceptibility divides transformers into
three exposure categories;
•

High (greater than 75 amperes per phase)

•

Medium (greater than 15 amperes per phase but less than 75 amperes per
phase)

•

Low (less than 15 amperes per phase).
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These categories may be determined using calculated relative levels of GIC that
transformers in a certain location, and would be subjected to for the benchmark GMD
storm.
The process of assessing the Total Susceptibility of a transformer to GIC events
combine the results of the Design – Based Susceptibility Assessment analysis and the
GIC Level–Based Susceptibility Assessment.
•

Transformers assessed to have a high level of Total Susceptibility to GIC effects
(Category IV) are those which belong to design classification D and are, at the
same time, located in high or medium GIC level areas. For this group of
transformers, both magnetic and thermal GIC capability (winding hotspot and
structural parts hotspot) evaluation may be considered.

•

Transformers assessed to have a medium level of Total Susceptibility to effects
of GIC (Category III) are those which are determined to be either in Design
Classification B or C and are located in high GIC level areas. For this group of
transformers, both magnetic modeling and thermal assessment of structural parts
may be performed.

•

Transformers assessed to have a low Total Susceptibility to effects of GIC
(Category II) are those which are determined to belong to Design Classification B
or C and are located in medium GIC level areas. For this group of transformers,
only magnetic modeling may be performed.

•

Transformers assessed to have practically no susceptibility to effects of GIC
(Classification A) are those which are determined to be either:
I) Design Classification B or C and are located in low GIC level areas, or
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II) Design Classification A
•

For Category 1, no further action may be considered.

Due to the nature of this thesis, it is important to note here that identifying a group of
transformers to be highly susceptible to winding or structural parts overheating does not
imply that these transformers will experience this overheating. It only identifies those
transformers that need detailed thermal assessment. Table 11 is a summary of Category
versus GIC Exposure Level Classification.
Low
Medium
High
Exposure
Exposure
Exposure
(≤15 A)
(>15 to 75 A)
(>75 A)
Not Susceptible (A)
1
1
1
Least Susceptible (B)
1
2
3
Susceptible (C)
2
3
3
Highly Susceptible (D)
2
4
4
Table 11 Transformer Total Susceptibility to the Effects of GIC in Amperes per

Classification of Transformer
Design Based Susceptibility

Phase
After the susceptibility of the assets are calculated, the utility industry may choose
appropriate actions to take to prevent damage from GIC. If the Transformer Total
Susceptibility is greater than two, online monitoring can be installed. Online monitoring
can take measurements of GIC on assets around the clock, making the tripping of assets
offline in the quickest time causing the least amount of damage.
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Chapter 6 Monitoring Techniques for GIC

Future GIC events are going to have an effect on the bulk power system. Massive
blackouts and costly damage to utility assets are some of the major risks that we face.
One way to prevent this is to establish specific parameters and performance
characteristics for power transformers to help minimize the risk and impact that GIC may
cause when events occur effecting the bulk power system.
Monitoring GIC activity of transformers is relatively easy. Hall Effect sensors are a
non-intrusive CT that can be installed on the neutral conductor to measure both ac and
dc currents. Hall Effect sensors are available in split core designs to make retrofitting a
GIC monitoring solution on a transformer simple. A short outage on the assets may be
required if safety clearances to the high voltage energized lines must be breached. The
split core Hall Effect sensor design does not required disconnecting any cabling to install.
Monitoring the cause for the damage from GIC flow through the neutral conductor
to ground is the approach that will prevent the most amount of damage to utility assets.
Other options that monitor the effects caused by GIC, such as increased transformer
saturation current, increased VAR consumption, harmonic content of the saturation
current, transformer overheating, tank wall overheating and DGA results are unable to
trip the transformer offline prior to the damage occurring. Harmonic measurements, while
able to monitor GIC, are only able to make measurements once the transformer’s core
has undergone half-cycle saturation. By this time irreversible damage may have occurred.
Monitoring the GIC flow through the neutral conductor can trip a transformer offline prior
to the damage that harmonics may cause.
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Figure 20 Response time of Dynamic Ratings Hall Effect Sensor
The Dynamic Ratings Inc. GIC sensor has a very good response time at 6 ] , as

depicted in Figure 20. The sensors are installed on the neutral conductor to ground prior
to any grounded restraints of the cable or bus bar. An example installation is shown in
Figure 21. The red circle is the Hall Effect sensor. It is installed as close to the neutral
bushing as possible and the conductor is centered in the sensor.
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Figure 21 Dynamic Ratings GIC Sensor Installed on Transformer
Starting on April 21st 2015, large concentrations of solar winds were ejected from
a coronal mass ejection. Three distinct CME’s were the source of concentrated solar
winds and caused an injection of electrically charged particles into the Earth’s
magnetosphere. The individual events caused geomagnetic disturbances around the
world. Three recorded instances occurred on June 21 at 16:45 UT, June 22 at 5:45 UT
and June 22 at 18:30 UT. By standard measures, this magnetic solar storm was the
second largest of the present solar cycle. As is typical for magnetic storms, activity was
particularly intense at high latitudes. At the USGS Barrow observatory in northern Alaska,
for example, the direction of the Earth’s magnetic field fluctuated by almost 10 degrees in
less than an hour. You could actually measure the effect of this storm on a simple
compass [23]. The aurora borealis were seen across Alaska, Canada and in many states
in the lower continental United States as far south as North Carolina, Georgia and Texas.
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The results of this event reached sever G4 levels on the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration’s space weather scale.

Figure 22 NOAA June 23, 2015 Aurora Forecast [24]
After the arrival at Earth of the third CME, data from NASA’s Advanced
Composition Explorer satellite indicates that the solar wind’s interplanetary magnetic field
was southward directed. The southward orientation is optimal for connection of the
interplanetary magnetic field onto geomagnetic field lines. Once this connection occurred,
the magnetosphere was effectively opened up to the solar wind allowing electrically
charged energetic particles to be deposited into the magnetotail, or the main source of
the polar aurora, and into the westward-flowing equatorial ring current of the inner
magnetosphere. This storm saw a maximum –195 nT on June 23 at about 04:30 UT.
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The conditions were all in favor for large GIC events occurring in the bulk power
system in northern parts of North America. Two transformers, with Dynamic Ratings GIC
sensors, were online collecting data throughout the time period of the storms. In Figure
23, the recorded GIC amperage results are graphed. One can clearly see the peaks of
the three distinct events.

Dynamic Ratings GIC Sensor Readings

15

10

XF.T1.GIC.ANALOG
0
6/23/2015 19:12

6/23/2015 7:12

6/22/2015 19:12

-15

6/22/2015 7:12

-10

6/21/2015 19:12

-5

6/21/2015 7:12

Amps

5

XF.T2.GIC.ANALOG

Date

Figure 23 Dynamic Ratings GIC Sensor Readings June 21-24
The two assets, with Dynamic Ratings GIC monitoring, were in the Midwest of the
United States and were clearly showing signs of GIC activity. The Transformer T1 asset
was located further north and experience a higher value GIC because it was located
inside the predicted area of high activity from Figure 22. Transformer T1 experienced

short bursts of ± 10 X_ on multiple occasions during the second of the two events.

As discussed in
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Chapter 5 Evaluation of Susceptibility of Power Transformers, both transformers have a
susceptibility of greater than three. Both assets should be monitored closely due to their
location and probability of being effected by solar storms in the future. Luckily, this was a
short lived event and the asset presented no signs of damage caused by GIC.
To further investigate this storm, this thesis will also investigate the dissolved gas
analyzer recordings to see if this event caused any internal gassing. Transformer T1 has
a Morgan Schaffer Calisto 9 installed for online monitoring purposes. As mentioned in
prior chapters, a dissolved gas analyzer will only trigger alarms after the damage to the
asset has occurred. The off gassing is a result of the damage to the transformer. Using
Morgan Schafer’s program Calisto Manager, the historical data was analyzed for key gas
increases. See Table 12 in Appendix C for more information on what causes key gases
in power transformers. Figure 24 shows the DGA recordings from April – August 2015.
Any key gases released in the transformer may take a week or two to circulate through
to the DGA device. The results do not indicate that any Partial Discharge or thermal
damage from harmonics occurred from the result of the GIC.
Although tripping a transformer offline may cause outages, it is the best way to
protect transformers from internal damage from GIC. Due to the varying degrees of
susceptibility, age, location and importance of the asset, the tripping trigger can vary
greatly. If the asset is declared a critical infrastructure piece of equipment, than greater
care must be taken to comply with the North American Electrical Reliability Corporation’s
Critical Infrastructure Protection program.
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Figure 24 Transformer T1 DGA Recording after GIC Event
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The bulk power system is operated using what is termed the N-1 operation
criterion. This N-1 criteria deems that the system must always be operated to withstand
the next credible disturbance contingency without causing a cascading collapse of the
system as a region or whole. GIC events cause almost simultaneous events that impact
the bulk power system over a wide area.
Tripping from just high current values from GIC events will protect the asset. When
tripping from current over time or current combined with thermal and other sensor inputs,
the asset experiencing GIC will be able to remain in service as long as possible prior to
any damage occurring. This is a key factor for preventing nuisance alarms, and causing
unnecessary outages breaking the N-1 operation criteria.
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Chapter 7 Conclusion
This thesis intends to raise the issue of geomagnetic phenomenon as a potential
disturbance to the bulk power system. A systematic approach was used to bring notice of
how susceptible the system actually is and how many different ways it can be effected
from one GIC event. This was achieved by studying the events that cause GIC,
mathematically modeling GIC, simulating GIC and discussing monitoring and
investigating real world data from a local event. If proper monitoring and mitigation
techniques are not rolled out system wide, we will see cascading outages like we have in
the past.
More field research must be conducted to come up with a valid monitoring and
mitigation process for each case. Contingency plans must be developed to maintain the
N-1 operation criteria. NERC and IEEE have all identified the issues discussed in this
thesis and are actively developing new guidelines so new products are designed with GIC
failure modes identified and lessened as much as possible. Guides for assessing
susceptibility of assets will be published by IEEE in the near future. Hopefully NERC CIP
will eventually publish regulations that must be abided by to prevent GIC events causing
large scale outages in the future, but until then any utility can actively create their own
monitoring and mitigation programs to prevent damage to their costly assets.
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Appendix A

Figure 25 Interior Plains IP-3 Resistivity Graph [10]
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Figure 26 Interior Plains IP-1 Resistivity Graph [10]
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Figure 27 Superior Upland SU-1 Resistivity Graph [10]
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Appendix B
OpenDSS code for simulation;
Clear
New circuit.GICtest
!GIC Line Data
New GICLine.1 bus1=1 bus2=2 R=4.334 Lat1=46.554666 Lon1=-90.990730 Lat2=43.113731
Lon2=-89.232048 EE=10.00 EN=0.00
New GICLine.2 bus1=3 bus2=4 R=4.028 Lat1=43.113731 Lon1=-89.232048 Lat2=43.019590
Lon2=-88.040024 EE=10.00 EN=0.00
!GIC Transformer Data
New GICTransformer.T1 busH=1 busNH=1.4.4.4 R1=0.5 type=GSU
New GICTransformer.T2 busH=3 busX=2 busNX=3.4.4.4 R1=0.2 R2=0.2 type=Auto
New GICTransformer.T3 busH=4 busNH=4.4.4.4 R1=0.5 type=GSU
!Substation Ground Grid Data
New Reactor.SUB1gnd phases=1 bus1=1.4 R=0.200 X=0
New Reactor.SUB2gnd phases=1 bus1=3.4 R=0.200 X=0
New Reactor.SUB3gnd phases=1 bus1=4.4 R=0.200 X=0
!Perform analysis
Set frequency=0.1
Solve
!Load file with bus coordinates, used for plotting
LatLongCoords LatLonFile.csv
Show Current Elements
Show Transformer Elements
plot circuit Current Max=70 dots=y labels=y subs=n C1=$00FF0000
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OpenDSS simulation generated results;
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Figure 28 OpenDSS Simulation GICLine1

Figure 29 OpenDSS Simulation GICLine2
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Appendix C

Table 12 DGA Gas Interpretation [25]
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Figure 30 T1 Transformer DGA History Long
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